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Rehabilitating the financial institutions that were failing in 1984
appears to have cost the Thai government no more than closing
them down and paying off depositors would have cost. In a situ-
ation like this, authorities  must make a tradeoff between preserv-
ing the financial system's well-being and being able to hold
managers of failed institutions accountable for their failure.
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the authors. reflect only their views, and should be used and cited accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations, and conclusions  arm  the
















































































































dPolicy,  Planning,  and Research
Ofie  of the  Vice  Presidentl
Between 1983 and 1984, 15 Thai finance  financial institutions as much as possible.  Sec-
companies - with Baht 9.8 billion in assets-  ond, chcnges in the Bank of Thailand Act and
went under, and many others were distressed.  the regu,ations governing commercial banks and
Authorities were faced with the choice of  finance companies gave the authorities more
rescuing the troubled institutions or closing them  power to handle problem institutions and
down. Closing an institution down is often less  prevent further crises.
costly, financially, than rescuing it - and the
most effective way to penalize shareholders and  Rehabilitating these institutions appears to
management. The risk in closing institutions is  have cost no more than closing them down and
that you might set off systemwide panic that  paying off depositors would have cost.  The
hurts both the domestic market and the country's  April 4, 1984 rehabilitation scheme cost Baht 8
ability to attract foreign funds.  billion.  Had these companies not been rescued,
the costs of a promissory note exchange, net of a
Although some companies failed to recover,  partial recovery from liquidation of assets,
the measures Thai authorities took succeeded in  would have cost close to Baht 8 billion.  And
restoring public confidence in the system.  rehabilitation allowed business concerns to
Deposits in finance companies, which had  continue borrowing from these institutions,
dropped to their lowest levels in 1984, gradually  strengthened the financial system, and may have
rose back to normal after the govemment's  allowed shares held by authorities to appreciate.
intervention - despite problems with inexperi-
enced management, high overhead costs, and the  Of course, the rescue option meant using
refusal of many former managers of these  govemment facilities and personnel.  And it is
companies to cooperate with the authorities.  more difficult to prosecute former managers
under a rehabilitation scheme than if the institu-
How did the authorities succeed in restoring  tion closes down.  The dilemma authorities face
public confidence?  First, in choosing to reha-  in a situation like this is the tradeoff they must
bilitate many financial institutions, the govem-  make between preserving the financial systemr's
ment demonstrated its commitment to preserving  well-being and preventing moral hazard.
This paper, a background paper for the 1989  World Development Report, is a product
of the Office of the Vice President, Development Economics. Copies are available
free from the World Bank, 1818  H StreetNW, Washington DC 20433. Pleasecontact
the World Development Report office, room S13-060, extension 31393 (28 pages).
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Planning, and Research
Complex. An objective of the scries is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations are less than fully polished.
The findings, intcrpretations, and conclusions in thesc papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.
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This paper  is the revised  version  of the paper previously  submitted  in
September  1988  to the Economic  Development  Institute  of the World  Bank  for the
preparation  of the 1989  World Development  Report.EXPERIMNCES  OF FIN  TNCIAL  DISMS$  IN THAILAND
In  the  past  decade  Thailcnd  ha  seew two  crises  in  financial
institutions  which  had  some  effects  on  the  economy  as  a  whole.  This
paper  will  recount  some  of  this  history  with  an  attempt  to  explain  the
causes  of  the  problem..  It  will  then  describe  measures  taken  by  the
authorities  in  response  to  these  problems.  Finally  an  assessment  of
the  effectiveness  of  these  measures  will  be  discussed.
The  paper  will  begin  with  an  overview  of  the  different  types
of financial  institutions  in  Thailand  and  their  supervisory  structure.
The  second  section  is  on  the  history  of  financial  distress  and  its  causes.
Two  cases  of  crises  in  finance  companies,  an  early  comercial  bank  case,
and  three  recent  commercial  bank  cases  will  be  discused.  (See  exhibit  1
for  their  data  sumary.) The  third  section,  on  measures  taken  by  the
authorities,  covers  assistance  to  depositors,  rehabilitation  programs,
legal  action  against  the  management,  and  reforms  in  regulations  and
supervision  method.  The  last  Aection  will  be  an  evaluation  of  these
measures  w.ith  respect  to  the  aut.iorities'  objectives,  namely  the  restoration
of  public  confidence  in  the  financial  system,  the  rehabilitation  of
problem  financial  institutions,  and  the  prevention  of  future  crisis.
I. OVERVIEW  OF  DIFFERENT  TYPES  OF  FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS  IN  THAILAND
Thailand  has  a  substantial  number  of  financial  institutions,
the  majority  of  which  are  privately  owned.  Among  the  different  types
of  financial  institutions,  commercial  banks  are  by  far  the  most  important,-2-
accounting  for  over  75  per  cent  of total  deposits  and total  credits
extended.  The  second  largest  group  consists  of  finance  companies.  The
remaining  groups  are  life  insurance  companies,  agricultural  cooperatives,
savings  cooperatives,  pawnshops,  credit  foncier  companies,  and  a  number
of  specialized  financial  institutions.  The  system  also  has  a substantial
non-institutional  sector. (See  exhibit  2.)
Presently  (December  1988),  there  are  30  comercial  banks  in
Thailand,  16  domestic  and  14  foreign,  with  a  total  of  Baht 1,147  billion
in  assets  and  Baht  890  billion  in  deposits.  About  60  per  cent  of  the
deposits  are  time  deposits,  while  the  remaining  are  savings  and  demand
deposits. Approximately  one-third  of loans  are  in the  form  of overdrafts.
These  advances  are  normally  on  a  short  term  basis  but  may  be renewed,
in  some  cases  for  several  years.  More  than  half  of  the  commercial  bank
credits  are  extended  to the  manufacturing  sector  and  the  wholesale,
retail,  and  foreign  trading  sectors. Lending  to the  agricultural  sector
amounts  to  only  a  small  fraction  of  total  credits.  Comnercial  banks
can  trade  foreign  exchange  but  are  not  permitted  to  be  in  the  securities
business.
Finance  companies  may  not  accept  deposits  in  the  same  form  as
commercial  banks.  Rather,  these  companies  borrow  funds  from  the  public
through  the  issuance  of  promissory  notes  or  similar  instruments.  The
interest  rates  offered  on  these  notes  are  somewhat  higher  than  deposit
rates  offered  by  commercial  banks.  At  present  (December  1988),  there  are
more  than  a  hundred  finance  companies  in  Thailand,  with  a  total  of  Baht196  billion  in  assets  and  Baht  117  billion  in  public  borrowings.  Two-thirds
of  credits  granted  by  finance  companies  are  short  term. Most  of  these  are
call  loans  and  discounting  of  bills  from  business  and  industrial  firms.
A few finance  companies  specialize  in  lease  financing  and  installment
credits.  Finance  companies  are  not  permitted  to  engage  in  foreign  exchange
business.  However,  some of  them have  permission  to  act  as  securities  brokers,
dealers,  underwriters,  and  investment  advisors.  As will  be  evident  later
in  the  paper,  the  problems  faced  by  finance  companies  can  be  a  consequence
of losses  in the  securities  business  as  well  as poor-quality  loans.
Supervision  of the  commercial  banks  and  finance  companies  is
the  responsibility  of the  Bank  of Thailand  under  the  authorization  of the
Minister  of Finance. Among  the  statutory  powers  conferred  to the  Bank  of
Thailand  are  the  powers  to  vary the  commercial  bank legal  reserve  requirement
and finance  company  liquidity  ratio;  to  prescribe  various  other  ratios
pertaining  to the  operations,  such  as the  capital  to risk  asset  ratios;
to  set  the  maximum  interest  rates  on loans,  deposits,  and  promissory  notes;
and  to examine  the  accounts  of commercial  banks  and  finance  companies.
Generally  the  Bank  of Thailand  carries  out its  policies  by exercising  the
powers  it  has  and  by seeking  cooperation  from  members  of the  banking  system.
In a number  of occasions,  however,  moral  suasion  is  proven  effective.
II.  HISTORY  OF FINANCIAL  DISTRESS  IN  FINANCIAL  INSTITUTIONS
The  case  of finance  companies
The  root  of the  problems  in  finance  companies  could  be traced
to as early  as their  inception. Before  1972,  finance  companies  merely-4  -
had  to  register  with  the  Ministry  of  Coumerce,  and  the  lack  of  specific
regulations  for  finance  and  securities  companies  made  it  impossible  for  the
authoritiee  to  closely  monitor  their  performances.  The  first  attempt  to
regulate  them  was  made  in  1972. However,  securities  laws  were  still
inadequate,  and  the  regulations  put  forth  in  1972,  which  covered  other  types
of  businesses  as  well,  were  rather  general  and  ineffective.  Specifically,
the  Bank  of  Thailand  had  no  authority  to  take  over  the  operations  or
protect  the  assets  of  finance  companies  in  crisis.  It  was  after  the
first  crisis  in  197T  that  the  Act  relating  to  Finance  Business,  Securities
Business  and  Credit  Foncier  Business  was  in  effect.
Prior  to  1979,  finance  and  securities  companies'  business  growth
was  very  high,  but the  quality  was  questionable.  Gains  on Securities  were
the  main  sources  of  income  for  these  companies,  and  speculation  became
widespread.  During  this  period,  a  major  finance  company named Raja  Finance
(Raja)  made loans  to  its  affiliates  and  other  clients  amounting  to  Baht
1.1  billion  for  the  purpose  of  investment  in  its  own  shares.  Share  price
rapidly  rose  in  a  frenzy  of  manipulation  to  24  times  par  in  November 1978,
after  which  it  continuously  declined.  Intervention  by  Raja  could  not
support  the  stock  price  and  eventually  led  to  its  liquidity  shortage.
Fearing  repercussions  on  the  overall  system,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and
the  Batk  of  Thailand  took  control  of  the  company.  Raja  was,  nevertheless,
closed  down  in  August  1979,  after  an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  rescue  it
while  coping  with  the  uncooperative  attitude  of  the  major  owner.  The
holders  of  its  promissory  notes  were  paid  off  only  20  per  cent  of  the  faceamounts.  Even  now  the  authority  officials  involved  are  still  entangled
in  a  legal  battle  with  the  major  owner.
The  main  causes  for  Raja's  Jownfall  were  mi3management  of  the
company-  compounded by  the  widespread  speculation  and  manipulation  of  stock
prices.  By lending  to  clients  who  used  the  loans  to  fund  their  purchase
of  Raja's  shares,  the  company was  in  effect  reducing  its  relative  capital,
and  thus  becwue highly  vulnerable  &.o  adverse  movement in  its  stock  price.
In  addition,  the  tightening  money markets  and  higher  interest  rates
contributed  further  to  Raja's  liquidity  shortage.
Investors  of  Raja's  stock  also  included  a  number  of  other  finance
companies.  Raja's  failure  undermined  the  public  confidence  in  the  securities
system  and  had  repercussions  on  these  other  companies  as  well. Under  these
circumstavces,  the  situation  faced  by finance  companies  became  even  more
serious  when the  economy at  the  time  was on  a  down trend.
-Although  the  authorities  aealt  with  the  crisis  by  intervening
in  the  securities  market  to  assure  a  certain  degree  of  market  stability,
and  by  putting  forth  measures  to  assist  finance  companies  in  their  liquidity
management,  many  companies  surviving  the  crisis  still  suffered  from  its
aftermath.  These  companies  included  those  having  invested  in  Raja's  and
other  stocks,  those  having  made  loans  to  RaJa,  and  those  whose  borrowers
incurred  securities  losses  during  the  crisis.  The economy during  1981
to  1983 was  also  weakened  by  major  changes  in  the  world  economy,  namely
the  slowing  of  global  demand,  the  increase  in  foreign  interest  rates
relative  to  domestic  rates,  and  the  increase  in  exchange  rate  volatility.-6-
In  trying  to  captur.5  a  larger  market  share,  a  number of  finance  compe'nies
did  not  exercise  sufficient  care  when  extending  vredits,  while  fraud  and
disa  nagement  were  rampant  in  many  others.  Several  companies  made  loans  to
affiliates  for  the  benefit  of  the  management  and  without  adequate  collateral.
Debtor  accounts  were  sometimes  falsified  to  cover  up  management's  embezzlement.
These  factors  led  to  another  crisis  in  1983.
The  finance  company  facing  greatest  difficulty  was  the  Equity
Devalopment  Trust  and  Finance  (EDT).  EDT  had  made  loans  to  its  affiliated
firms  to  buy  shares  in  Rama  Tower  Hotel,  which,  in  turn,  had  a  deep  involvement
with  Carrian  Group  in  Hong  Kong,  as  Rama  Tower  and  Carrian  held  shares  in
one  another.  Carrian  Group experienced  a  serious  problem  and  was  having  a
severe  liquidity  shortag-Z.  Rama  Tower's  shares  were  directly  affected.
EDT's  attempt  to  support  Rama  Tower's  stock  price  did  not  succeed,  and  the
accumulation  of  carrying  costs  of  funds  borrowed  for  this  purpose  led  to
EDT's  own  liquidity  crisis.  Since  EDT  borrowed  from  several  other  finance
companies,  the  Bank  of  Thailand  at  first  tried  to  avoid  closing  the  company
and  asked  Bangkok  Bank,  Limited,  Thailand's  largest  commercial  bank,  to
take  over  EDT. However,  further  examination  showed  EDT's  financial  status
to  be  beyond  rescue.  EDT  and  four  other  related  companies  were  closed  down
in  December  1983.
The magnitude  of  the  second  crisis  was  much  greater  than  that
of  the  1979  crisis.  Between  September  1983 and  April  1984,  65  finance
and  securities  companies  not  affiliated  to  commercial  banks  had  a  total
of  Baht  8  billion  of  their  promissory  notes  withdrawn  by  the  public,  in
spite  of  the  Joint  effort  by  the  authorities  and  the  Thai  commercial  banks
to  set  up  a  Baht  5  billion  liquidity  fund  for  such  companies.  In  the  years7
1983  to  1984,  a  total  of  15  finance  companies  (including  securities  companies
and  credit  fonciers)  with  Baht  9.8  billion  in  assets  went  under.  Only
later  in  1984,  after  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  BEnk  of  Thailand
announced  a  plan  to  take  over  the  ownership  and  management  of  a  number
of  finance  companies,  was  the  public  confidence  gradually  restored.
Early  History  of  Comercial  Banks
Among  the  early  cases  of  financial  distress  in  banks  was  the
case  of  the  Agricultural  Bank  in  1959. Founded  in  1950,  the  bank  had
about  Baht  600  million  in  assets,  and  specialized  in  providing  financial
services  to  the  agricultural  and  agro-industrial  sectors.  This  concentration
made  it  difficult  to  diversify  the  bank's  risks.  Loans  to  these  sectors
were  generally  riskier  than  those  to  other  sectors  by  nature,  since  the
outcome  largely  depended  on  factors  the  bank  could  not  control,  such  as
the  climate  and  global  commiodity  prices.  Prior  to  1959,  the  bank  had
also  been  increasing  its  branches  rapidly  with  neither  a  proper  planning
nor  a  sufficiently  reliable  internal  control  system.  Thus,  the  management
at  the  head  office  was  unable  to  assess  the  entire  bank's  financial  standing
in  a  timely  manner.  Furthermore,  a  large  volume  of  loans  had  been  extended
to  businesses  owned  by  major  shareholders  of  the  bank  with  inadequate
collateral.  After  these  businesses  failed,  the  bank  experienced  a  severe
liquidity  shtortage.
The  Bank  of  Thailand  responded  to  the  liquidity  probla'  by
granting  a low  interest  loan  through  the  Government  Savings  Bank. A  few
state  enterprises  were  also  requested  to  maintain  non-interest  bearing- 8  -
deposit  accounts  in  the  bank. The  Ministry  of  Finance  eventually  took
over  the  ownership  and  management  of  the  bank,  and  its  financial  status
gradually  improved.  Deposits  grew  from  Baht  300  million  in  1959  to  Baht
1,300  million  in  1964. Later  in  1P66  the  bank  was  merged  with  another
government-owned  bank,  tbe  Provincial  Bank,  to  form  a  single  governmetnt-
owned commercial  bank,  namely  the  Krung Thai  Bank.
Recent  History  of  Commercial  Banks
The  Asia  Trust  Bank  (l984
The  Asia  Trust  Bank  (ATB)  was  founded  in  1965  by  the
Tarnvanichkul  family.  At  the  end  of  June  1984  it  had  Baht  10.6  billion
in  assets  and  Baht  6.3  billion  in  deposits.  The  bank  normally  had  a
substantial  amount  of  foreign  business.  Until  1979,  its  loans  and
deposits  grew  at  a  rapid  rate  of  over  20  per  cent  each  year. A  significant
portion  of  loans  were  made  to  businesses  owned  by  ATB's  major  shareholders
and  most  of  them  without  adequate  collateral.  After  1979  deposits  growth
began  to  slow  down,  while  loans  growtlh  remained  high. Interests  on  these
loans  were  largely  uncollectible,  and  the  bank  began  to  suffer  from  a
liquidity  shortage.  Under  these  circumstances,  ATB  became  increasingly
dependent  on  foreign  borrowings,  and  its  problem  was  thus  compounded  by
the  rise  in  foreign  interest  rates  and  incrt_%aing  exchange  rate  volatility.
In  1983  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  Bank  of  Thailand  appointed
an  outsider  to  be  in  ATB's  management  team.  Evidences  of  fraud  and
mismanagement  were  found  shortly  after,  including  the  dressing  up  of
accounts  to  conceal  losses,  and  substantial  off-balance  sheet  commitments- 9  -
on  behalf  of  a  Hong  Kong  finance  company,  also  owned  by  the  Tarnvanichkul
family.  The  situation  we-  aggravated  by  internal  conflicts,  leading  to
ATS's  dismissal  of  the  authorities'  appointee  in  July  1984. Finally  a
run  at  ATB  in  August  1984  prompted  the  Ministry  of  Finance  to  take  over
the  ownership  and  the  mnagement  of  the  bank.  Financial  assistances  in
the  torm of  low  interest  loans  and  new equity  were  given,  along  with  a
requirement  that  ATBDs  capital  be  reduced  from  a  par  value  of  Baht  100
to  Baht  5.  (Under  the  Thailand  Civil  and  Commercial  Code,  a  share
must  have  a  minimum  par  value  at  Baht  5.)  The bank  changed  its  name to
Sayan  Bank. Subsequently  in  1987  most  of  its  assets  and  liabilities  were
transferred  to  the  Krung Thai  Bank,  another  government-owned  bank,  and
Sayan  Bank ceased  its  normal  operations.
First  Bangkok  City  Bank  (1986)
Founded  in  1934 by  Chinese  businessmen  in  Thailand  and  taken
over  twice  in  1960  and  1970,  First  Bangkok  City  Bank  (FBCB) was owned and
managed by  Mr.  Kamron Tejapaibool.  The Bank's  capital  grew  from  Baht  87
million  in  1069  to  Baht  1  billion  in  1983. It  dealt  largely  with  Chinese
businessmen  both  in  and  outside  Thailand,  and  had  a  substantial  volume  of
foreign  exchange  trading.  FBCB's  management  style  was  highly  centralized,
with  decisions  being  made  solely  by  the  Managing  Director.
In  1982  the  Bank  of  Thailand  found  that  FBCB  had  financial  damages
up  to  Baht  5  billion,  including  Baht  2  billion  in  loans  to  Mr.  Kamron's  business- 10  -
in  Hong  Kong  which  was  also  under  difficulty,  and  Baht  2.8  billion  in  exchange
losses  f 'cm  speculation.  The Bank of  Thailand  initially  responded  by  changing
the  management  and  putting  its  official  on  the  board.  However,  FBCB's  problems
escalated  an  additional  loan  losses  were  identified.  In  1986  the  Bank  of
Thailand  requested  that  FBCB's  capital  be  reduced  by  Baht  1.3  billion,  from
a  par  value  of  Baht  100  to  Baht  5. In  addition,  Baht  2  billion  in  new  capital
(only  part  of  which  came  from  the  authorities  and  the  rest  from  private
interests)  and  Baht  3.3  billion  in  low  interest  loans  were  injected,  along
with  an  appointment  of  a  new management by  the  authorities.
Siam  City  Bank  (1987)
The  Siam  City  Bank  (Siam  City)  was  founded  in  1941  by  government
officials,  royalties,  and  a  few  government  departments.  After  two  major
capital  increases  in  1965  and  1971  and  several  ownership  reshuffles,  the
Mahadamrongkul  group  emerged  as  the  major  shareholder  group.
By  1982,  it  was  discovered  that  Siam  City  had  accumulated  large
losses  resulting  from bad  loans,  part  of  which  were  made to  businesses
owned by  the  bank's  major  shareholders.  By 1983 Siam City  was  technically
insolvent,  its  capital  being  negative  Baht  380 million.  The Bank of  Thailand
advised  Siam  City  to  increase  its  capital,  but  internal  conflicts  prevented
it  from  happening.  In  1986  the  Bank  of  Thailand  ordered  Siam  City  to
increase  its  capital  by  Baht  1.5  billion,  but  the  management  were  unable  to
do  so. Finally  in  1987  the  Bank  of  Thailand  requested  that  Siam  City's
capital  be  reduced  from  a  par  value  of  Baht  100  to  Baht  5,  along  with  a  capital
increase  of  the  size  Baht  1.5  billion.  Most  of  the  capital  increase  was
subscribed  by  the  public  due  to  favorable  performance  of  FBCB's  share  prices
after  the  intervention.III. TYPES  OF INTERVENTION  BY THE  AUTIHORITIES  AND  THEIR  RATIONALE
There  is  no  unique  solution  to  the  problem  of  financial  distress.
Nor  is  there  one  single  indicator  as  to  whether  a  financial  institution
in  trouble  should  be  rescued  or  closed  down. Both  options  entail  certain
advantages  and  disadvantages.  Closing  down  an  institution  is  often  the
least  costly  solution  in  financial  terms  and  offers  the  most  effective
way  to  penalize  the  shareholders  and  management.  However,  by  choosing  this
option,  the  authorities  risk  having  a  system-wide  panic  which  can  affect
not  only  the  domestic  credit  amarket  but  also  the  country's  reputation  much
needed  to  eonsure  the  availability  of  foreign  sources  of  funds.  On  the
other  hand,  while  the  decision  to  rescue  an  ailing  firm  should  minimize
the  potential  for  a  panic,  the  costs  of  rescue  could  be  very  high  and  the
final  outcome  questionable.  Furthermore,  using  this  type  of  solution
frequently  may  give  rise  to  moral  hazard  in  the  financial  system. Thus,
an  optimal  decision  in  eacht  case  depends  not  only  on the  financial  factors
but  also  on  the  social,  economic,  and  political  factors.
Problems  with  commercial  banks  are  usually  coped  with  by  using
some  form  of  financial  assistance  or  management  restructuring  or  both,
rather  than  permitting  the  institutions  to  fail. There  are  a  number  of
reasons  for  this  practice.  First  is  the  fact  that  the  problems  the  banks
faced  in  the  past  often  occurred  in  the  middle  of  an  economic  downturn  and
when  the  whole  financial  system  was  vulnerable  to  shocks  and  increasingly
volatile  environment.  Furthermore,  there  was  already  a  large  non-institutional- 12 -
financial  sector.  Although  the  total  deposits  ill  this  sector  could  not  be
accurately  estimated,  they  were  believed  to  be  quite  substantial.  At  one
time  in  1984  - 1985,  there  were  a few  big  pools  of  such  informal  funds,  each
of  which  could  mobilize  funds  up  to  Baht  8  billion  (about  the  volume  of  a
mid-size  comercial  bank  deposits).  The  authorities  feared  that  a  failure
of  a  relatively  large  financial  institution  might  destroy  the  public
confidence  in  the  institutional  financial  system  to  the  extent  that  the
confidence  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  would  also  be  eroded  and  the
country's  credit  rating  impaired.  Also  of  importance  is  the  fact  that
throughout  history,  never  has  a  commercial  bank  been  permitted  to  fail.
Thus,  to  let  a  commercial  bank  fail  would  be  a  very  tough  decision  for
the  Finance  Mirister  or  the  Bank  of  Thailand  Governor.
In  the  case  of  finance  companies,  historical  evidence  shows
that  the  authorities  handled  the  problems  by  closing  the  companies  and
revoking  their  licenses  in  about  as  many  cases  as  by  giving  financial
or  managerial  assistance.  Among  the  finance,  securities,  and  credit
foncier  companies  facing  severe  hardslhip  between  1979  and  1988,  5  were
given  financial  assistance  with  the  majority  of  their  policy  decisions
remaining  independent  from  the  authorities,  25  were  given  financial
assistance  while  the  authorities  temporarily  took  over  the  management
and  ownership,  and  28 were  closed  *lown  and  had  their  licenses  revoked
by  the  authorities.  Why the  option  of  letting  a  finance  company fail
is  more  feasible  than  it  is  in  the  case  of  commercial  banks  can  be
explained  as  follows.  Althouglh  the  authorities  are  concerned  about  a
system-wide  panic,  the  sizes  of  finance  companies  affected  tend  to  be- 13 -
quite  small  relative  to the  sizes  of comercial banks,  and if  a finance
company  were  to  fail,  its  impact  on  the  financial  system  should  be  less
pronounced  than  that  of  a  bank  failure.  Therefore  it  is  generally  easier
to  let  a  finance  company  fail,  especially  when  the  decision  can  be  justified
by  a  financial  cost  and  benefit  comparison.  Raja  Finance  in  1979,  for
example,  had  only  Baht  198  milion  in  valuable  and  uncollateralized  assets,
while  its  net  creditors'  position  was  Baht  643  million,  and  it  was  evident
then  that  the  company  could  not  easily  be  salvaged.  Furthermore,  Raja's
closure  in  1979  set  a  precedent  for  subsequent  cases,  making  closing  a
finance  company  a  viable  alternative.
Assistance  to the  Depositors  in  the  Evetnt  of  Closure
When the  Raja  crisis  occurred  in  1979,  the  holders  of  Raja's
promissory  niotes  were  paid  only  20  per  cent  of  the  face  values,  since
the  authorities  were  not  prepared  to  compensate  them  fully  then. However,
the  depositors  of  other  finance  companies  that  were  subsequently  closed
down  were  treated  more  favorably  through  a  promissory  note  exchange  program.
In  the  early  phase  of  this  program,  4 finance  companies  were
chosen  by  the  authorities  to  be  the  exchangers.  The  exchange  was  done
according  to  the  following  procedure.  The  holders  of  a  closed  finance
company's  promissory  notes  exchanged  these  notes  for  a  series  of  promissory
notes  issued  by  the  exchangers.  The  total  face  values  were  the  same  as
before,  but  the  maturities  were  spreaded  out  over  a  period  of  up  to  10  years,
and  no  interest  was  paid. The  exchangers  were  compensated  with  a  low
interest  rate  loan  from  the  Bank  of  Thailand,  collateralized  by  government- 14  -
bonds.  The  exchangers'  losses  from  the  exchanging  of  promissory  notes
were offset  by the  net  gains  from  the  interests  of the  bonds. Later  on
when the  Financial  Institutions  Development  Fund (FIDF)  (mentioned  later
in  detail)  was formed,  it  took  over  the  function  of the  exchanger  of
promissory  notes  in the  event  of finqnce  company  closure. The  procedure
is the  same  as before,  except  the  cost  of exchanging  the  notes  is  now
fully  borne  by the  FIDF.
There  are  three  major  characteristics  of the  promissory  note
exchange  program. The  first  is that  the  promissory  notes  held  by the
management  of the  closed  institution  and  related  parties  (including
affiliated  firms)  are  not  eligible  for  the  program. The  second  is that
the  authorities  make their  total  costs  supportable  by extending  the
repayment  periods  over 10  years  without  interest. The third  lies  in the
structure  of the  repayment  itself. Basically  each  depositor  will receive
no  more than  10  new  notes,  each  with  a face  value  of one-tenth  of the
original  amount.  However,  the  face  value  of  the  new note  maturing  in
the  first  year  must  be  at  least  Baht  50,000  (or  the  original  amount  if
it is  already  less  than  Baht  50,000).  Thus,  all  depositors  will  be paid
off  in no more  than  10  years,  but  the  repayment  is relatively  faster  for
smaller  depositors.  Particularly,  those  with  Baht  50,000  or less  will
be paid  within  a year. These  people  account  for  almost  90 per  cent  of
the total  number  of depositors.  This  method  implies  that  the  authorities
give  higher  priority  to  smaller  depositors.- 15  -
Rehatilitation  of  Finance  Companies
Finance  companies  in  crisis  but  not  closed  down  by  the  authorities
are  restored  by  way  of  financial  and  managerial  assistance.  The  degree
of  involvement  by  the  authorities  varies  from  a  mere  financial  assistance
with  minimal  management  involvemetnt,  to  a  management  and  ownership  takeover
for  a relatively  longer  term,  depending  on  the  magnitude  of  the  problem
and  available  resources  from  other  members  of  the  financial  market.
When  there  is  another  financial  institution,  domestic  or  foreign,
expressing  interest  in  the  finance  company  in  crisis,  and  when  the
rehabilitation  plan  proposed  by  that  party  is  acceptable  to  the  authorities,
it  is  likely  that  the  authorities  would  opt  for  a takeover  of  the  finance
company  by  that  party.  Several  cases  were  handled  in  this  manner,  and
in  most  of  them  financial  assistance  was also  given  to  the  finance  company
under  the  new  management,  usually  in the  form  of a  low  interest  rate  loan.
If  there  is  no  outside  interest  for  the  ailing  finance  company,
the  authorities  may  decide  to  take  control  of  the  company  temporarily,
and  when  the  owners  or  former  mnnagement  come  up  with  an  acceptable
rehabilitation  plan,  the  company  can  be  released.  In  choosing  this  option
the  authorities  may  end  up  closing  the  company  eventually  if  no  rehabilitation
plan  can  be  agreed  upon  and  no  merger  party  can  be  found.
Rehabilitation  plans  that  have  worked  in  the  past  generally
incorporate  the  following  features.  The  first  is  an  injection  of  new- 16  -
capital,  which  may  have  to  be  substantial  if  the  size  of  problem  loan  is
large.  If  the  new  capital  is  brought  in  by  new  investors,  they  may  require
a  prior  capital  reduction  to  offset  some  retained  losses.  In  some  cases
where  new  investors  are  not  readily  available,  the  authorities  may  have
to  help  subscribe  to  the  new  issues  partially.  The  second  is  a  business
plan  to  bring  in  additional  revenues.  The  third  is  a  proposal  to  control
the  level  of  operating  costs  and  to  cut  back  the  unnecessary  items,  as
well  as  to  improve  the  accounting  and  internal  control  systems.  The  fourth
is  a  problem  loan  recovery  plan,  and,  to  the  extent  that  recovery  is  not
possible,  a  write-off  plan. Lastly,  a  team  of  professional  management
sust  be  submitted  for  the  authorities'  consideration.  The  rationale  is
that  the  company  under  rehabilitation  should  return  to  health  in  a
reasonable  period  of  time,  without  having  to  turn  to  the  authorities  for
assistance  repeatedly.
Several  finance  companies  in  the  1983  - 1984  crisis,  however,
could  not  be  rescued  by  outside,  private  parties  in  such  manners,  since
there  was  not  another  party  interested  in  taking  over  these  companies  at
the  time,  and  since  they  could  not  come  up  with  a  rehabilitation  plan
satisfactory  enough  to  warrant  financial  assistance  from  the  authorities.
At  the  same  time,  fearing  that  a  system-wide  panic  could  be  disastrous,
the  authorities  did  not  want  to respond  by closing  down  these  finance
companies.  Their  action,  then,  was  to  announce  a  group  rehabilitation
program  run  by  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  later  known  as  the  April  4,  1984
Scheme after  the  announcement  date.  Twenty-five  finance  companies  were- 17 -
admitted  into  the  program.  Together  they  had  Baht  15.3  billion  in  assets,
roughly  half  of  which  were  non-performing.
The  main  feature  of  the  April  4,  1984  Scheme  was  the  stipulation
that  the  owners  of  the  companies  Joining  the  Scheme  had  to  cooperate  with
the  authorities  and  accept  conditions  imposed  upon  them. These  conditions
included  a  transfer  of  at  least  25  per  cent  of  the  companies'  shares  to
the  Ministry  of  Finance  at  minimal  nominal  prices  and  a  transfer  of  additional
voting  rights  sufficient  to  give  the  authorities  management  control  of
these  companies.  In  addition,  the  former  owners  were  held  responsible
for  the  losses  arising  from  the  loans  that  had  been  made  to  affiliated
firms  which  they  also  owned,  and  therefore  had  to  put  up  their  own  assets
as  collateral  for  these  loans.  It  was  also  agreed  that  the  major  shareholders
would  be  responsible  for  all  the  burdens  of  the  companies,  including  those
which  were  nrot  known  then  but  which  might  become  evident  later.
The  authorities,  in  turn,  would  guarantee  the  entire  principals
and  interests  of  all  promissory  notes  held  by  the  public.  Financial
assistances  in  the  form  of  long-term  low  interest  rate  loans  from  the
Bank  of  Thailand,  overdraft  facilities  at  the  Krung  Thai  Bank,  and  equity
participations  by  the  authorities  were  also  given.  The  sdhorities
appointed  their  officials  to  take  over  or  assist  with  the  management  of
the  companies  and  to  isprove  the  internal  control  systems.  After  recovery,
the  authorities  could  sell  their  shares  to  the  public,  or  to  the  former
owners  it  they  could  demonstrate  their  mnagement  capabilities  to  the
satisfaction  of  the  authorities.  Five  of  the  25  companies  that  joined
the  Scheme  were  released  in  this  latter  manner.- 18 -
The  authorities  also  encourage  mergers  of small  finance  companies
to form  a large  finance  company  in  order  to  benefit  from  the  economy  of
scale  as well  as to use  the  country's  management  resources  more  efficiently.
There  were  two  such  mergers  within  the  companies  Joining  the  Scheme,  one
among  six  companies  and  the  other  among  three. These  mergers  were  desirable
because  the  companies  within  each  group  shared  a  common group  of  owners
and  made  loans  to  the  same  group  of  affiliates.
Rehabilitation  of  Conmercial  Banks
The  first  step  toward  the  restoration  of  a problem  bank  with
large  accumulated  losses  is  usually  an order  from  the  Bank  of Thailand,
requiring  the  problem  bank to raise  additional  capital  to  strengthen  its
financial  position  and  build  a base  for  future  revenues. However,  a capital
increase  canlbe  difficult  to acc:omplish,  because  potential  investors  may
be reluctant  to  share  the  previously  incurred  losses. In  such  cases,  the
Bank of Thailand  will  order  the  problem  bank  to reduce  the  par  value  of
its  shares  (usually  from  a  par  value  of Baht  100  to  Baht  5  which  is the
minimum  possible),  while  the  number  of shares  remains  the  same,  so that
the  reduction  in  capital  can  partially  offset  the  accumulated  losses  before
new  shares  are  issued. This  method  of officially  reducing  the  capital
before  issuing  new  shares  has  also  been  used  with the  finance  companies
Joining  the  April  4, 1984  Scheme. After  the  capital  reduction,  if the
problem  bank  still  cannot  raise  new  capital  as required,  the  authorities
may subscribe  to  some  of the  new  shares  through  the  Financial  Institutions
Development  Fund.- 19  -
For  commercial  bsnks  (as  well  as  finance  companies)  in  trouble,
one  of  the  most  often  used  formis  of  financial  assistance  from  the  government
is  the  low  Interest  rate  loan  fully  secured  by  government  bonds,  also  known
as  the  "soft  loan".  The  bank  receiviog  a  soft  loan  benefits  from  the
difference  between  the  interests  on  the  government  bonds  and  the  interests
charged  on  the  soft  loan  (normally  very  low  at  around  O.1X),  and  the  entire
principal  amount  is  guaranteed  to  the  lender  (usually  the  Bank  of  Thailand).
The  rationale  for  this  type  of  assistance  to  supplement  the  capital
injection  is  that,  in  most  cases,  even  after  a  capital  reduction  is  imposed
upon  the  former  owners,  the  at-ctmulated  losses  still  have  not  been  fully
offset,  and  the  public  may  need  additional  incentives  to  subscribe  to  the
new  shares  being  issued.  The  soft  loan  can  function  as  one  such  enticement.
A variation  of  t.he  soft  loan  is  what  is  known  as  the  "conditional
loan",  given  to  the  Bank  of  Asiai  in  1987.  This  bank  did  not  want  to  dilute
its  ownership  structure  by  selling  its  new  issues  to  the  public.  Rather,
it  opted  for  a  private  capital  increase  among  the  same  shareholders.
Therefore,  a  soft  loan  to  this  bank  could  not  be  justified  on  the  grounds
of  being  a  necessary  enticement  for  public  investors.  An  additional
condition  was  imposed  upon  the  borrower,  hence  the  name  "conditional  loan".
The  condition  is  that  Bank  of  Asia  had  to  return  to  the  authorities  some
of  the  benefit  from  this  loan  by  allowing  the  FIDF  to  buy  a  certain  portion
of  its  subsequent  issues  at  par.
Whether  or  not  a  soft  loan  can  be  successfully  provided  depends
on a  number  of factors. First  of  all,  the  a.-ount  of  the  soft  loan  must- 20  -
be substantial  enough  for  its  benefit  to be meaningful.  At least  the  net
interests  received  by the  company  should  be able  to  stop the  bleeding  due
to the  carrying  costs  of  non-performing  assets. The company must  also
create  additional  profits  from  operations  so that  it  can return  to normalcy
and  stand  on its  own  after  the  term  of the  soft  loan  is  over.  The  quality
of the  management  is  crucial,  since  the  management  is responsible  for
forming  strategic  and  business  plans  to  achieve  this  objective  as  well  as
putting  the  plans  into  effect.
The  authorities,  therefore,  have  given  significant  management
assistance  to the  problem  banks.  In  mcst  cases,  professionals  from  the
private  sector  were  appointed  to take  over  or assist  with the  management
and to improve  the  internal  control  systems. Government  officials  were
also  appointed  when  necessary.
Leital  Action  Aztainst  the  Management  of Problem  Financial  Institutions
Several  lawsuits  have  been  brought  by the  Bank  of  Thailand  as
well  as the  private  sector  against  the  management  of problem  banks  and
finance  companies  suspected  of fraud  and  embezzlement.  Because  of the
past limitation  in  statutory  powers  given  to  the  authorities,  the  result
has been  far  from  successful. Of  the  222  suspects  in  the  case  of finance
companies  as of April  1988,  only  31  have  been  brought  to the  court  level,
of  which  only  5  have  been  found  guilty,  while  26  still  remain  under
prosecution, Also,  many  suspects  under  investigation  by state  attorneys
have  left  the  country.- 21 -
In  response  to  this  problem,  and  in  order  to  enable  the  authaities
to  make  timely  intervention  in  the  future,  the  laws  concerning  financial
institutions  were  amended  in  1985. The  amendments  mainly  cover  the
following  aspects:
1) Information  disclosure  and  examination
- Financial  institutions  are  required  to  disclose  their  financial  statements
to the  public  every  six  months.
- The  auditors  of  the  statements  must  be  approved  by  the  Bank  of  Thailand.
- Examiners  and  other  related  officials  are  given  more  authority  in  the
inspection  of  financial  institutions.
2)  Prevention  of  damages
- The  Bank  of  Thailand  can  order  a financial  institution  to  make  operational
changes  when  there  are  sufficient  evidences  that  such  changes  are  necessary
to  prevent  public  damages.
- The  Bank  of  Thailand  can  order  a financial  institution  to  make  adequate
provision  for  loan  losses  and  other  doubtful  assets.
- The  Bank  of  l'hailand  can  order  a  financial  insti  :-tion  to  reduce  its
capital  value,  to  raise  additional  capital,  and  to ,hange  the  management,
when  there  are  sufficient  evidences  that  such  action  is  necessary.
- The  Finance  Minister  can  order  a  financial  institution  to  cease  all
or  part  of  its  operations  temporarily  in  the  case  of  a  crisis.
3)  Prosecution  of  the  mannaement  for  their  wrongdoings
- The  authorities  have  the  power  to  seize  the  assets  of  any  person  suspected
of  fraud  or  eabezzlesent  temporarily  until  a  court  verdict  has  been  reached,
and  to  prohibit  the  suspect  from  leaving  the  country.22  -
The  officials  appointed  by  the  authorities  can  represent  the  public  in
the  prosecution  of  the  management  suspected  of  fraud  or  embezzlement.
Formation  of  the  Financial  Institutions  Development  Fund
In  addition  to  tbe  previously  mentioned  amendments,  another
amendment  was  made  at  the  same  time  to  the  Bank  of  Thailand  Act,  with  an
aim  to  allow  the  Bank  of  Thailand  greater  flexibility  in  giving  financial
assistance  to  financial  institutions  in  distress.  Through  this  amendment,
the  Financial  Institutions  Development  Ftnd  (FIDF)  was  formed  within  the
Bank of ThH§aland.  Its legal status  is  thtat  of a juristic person, and its
stated  purposes  are to restore  itiling  financial  institutions  to  good
condition,  aid  to  bring  about  strengtlh  and  stability  in  the  financial
system.  Thte  FTDF  has  its  own board  of  directors  separate  from  the  Bank
of  Thailanid,  but  its  operations  are  handled  by  the  staffs  of  the  Bank.
Statutory  powers  given  to  the  FIDF  include  the  powers  to  invest
in  short-termu  securities;  to  hold  depo3its  in  financial  institutions;  to
lend  to  financial  institutions  with  collateral;  to  purchase  assets  from
and  to  buy  and  hold  shares  in  financial  institutions;  and  to  give  financial
assistance  to  the  depositors  of  a failing  institution.  Its  sources  of  funds
come  from  tlh  mandatory  contributions  from  finanicial  itnstitutions  (currently
set  at  thes  annual  rate  of  0.1  %  of  deposits),  as  well  as  from  the
participationis  and  advances  from  the  Bank  of  Thailand  as  the  Bank  deems
appropriate.
While  there  is  no  explicit  deposit  insurance  scheme  as  such,
depositors  receive  an  implicit  ptotection  through  the  operations  of  the
FTDF. A full-fledged  deposit  insurance  scheme  is  under  consideration,  but
its  concept  anid  design  stil  call  for  further  study.- 23 
Improvemenit  in the  Supervision  and  Examination  of Financial  Institutions
Examination  in the  past  used  to  be performed  at all  offices  and
branches  anti  in  all  possible  aspects. Therefore  it  was  almost  impossible
for  the  examiners  to look  into  any  particular  area in  depth. After  the
crises,  the  1ank  of  Thailanid  has  turned  to  selective  examination,  withi  an
emphasis  on1 Ihe  quality  or asRets  and  targeting  the  main  offices,  to  improve
the  effect;iveness  of  examinationi,  To  this  end,  the  examiners  are  empowered
by law  in thc  case  of finance  companies  to  examine  also  their  debtors.
Furthermore,  the  supervisory  authorities  have  been  paying  greater  attention
to  the  management  of financial  institutions  and  have  tried  to  replace
family-style  management  with professional  management  whenever  possible.
IV.  ASSESSMENT  OF RESULTS
Measures  taken  by the  authorities  have  been  especially  successful
in  the  restoration  of public  confidence  in the  financial  system. Deposits
In finance  companies,  which  had  dropped  to their  lowest  levels  in  1984,
gradually  rose  back to  normal  after  the  government's  intervention.  (See
exhibit  3.)  Although  the  pattern  is  not  so obvious  in  the  case  of commercial
banks  due to the  relatively  small  sizes  of  banks  affected,  as a  whlole,
there  are fewer  problem  institutions,  and  the  role  and  importance  of the
non-institutional  financial  sector  have  been  greatly  reduced.- 24  -
The  authorities'  success  in  restoring  public  confidence  can  be
mainly  attributed  to  two  factors.  One  is  that,  by  choosing  to  rehabilitate
the  financial  institutions  (which  was  the  choice  in  many  cases),  the
government  deaonstrated  its  coisitment  to  the  preservation  of  financial
institutions  to  the  extent  liossible.  The other  is  that  there  have  been
a  significant  number  of  changes  in  the  Bank of  Thailand  Act  and  the
regulations  of  commercial  banks  and  finance  companies,  allowing  the
authorities  more capaoity  to  handle  problem  institutions  and  to  prevent
future  crisis.
The  rehabilitation  program  itself  has  had  a  number  of  obstacles
but  is  still  considered  to  be  moderately  successful.  First  Bangkok  City
Bank has  been  making  profits  since  1987,  and  Siam  City  Bank  since  the
second  half  of  1987. Among  the  25  finance  companies  in  the  April  4,  1984
Scheme,  5  were  already  released  back  to  the  former  owners.  As  for  those
finance  companies  unable  to  regain  their  strengths  according  to  the  plan,
their  inferior  performances  have  been  a  result  of  having  large  non-performing
assets  with  collaterals  that  could  not  be  easily  liquidated.  Many former
managers  of  these  companies  refused  to  cooperate  with  the  authorities,  thus
making  it  difficult  to  recover  the  loans  made to  these  managers  and  their
other  businesses.  Other  obstacles  to  the  rehabilitation  program  include
the  lack  of  experienced  professional  managers  and  the  high  overhead  costs
resulting  from  the  inability  to  reduce  the  number  of  unqualified  employees.
The  efficiency  of  the  rehabilitation  measures  can  be  assessed
by  comparing  the  costs  and  benefits  of  this  program  with  what  would- 25  -
have  been,  had  the  authorities  allowed  these  institutions  to fail  and  close
down.  Tn the  case  of the  April  4, 1984  Scheme,  the  costs  to  complete  the
program,  as estimated  from  the interest  expenses  and  opportunity  costs  borne
by the  authorities  and  valued  at the  time  of  the  ciisis  in 1984,  would  be
approximately  Baht  8  billion. Had  these  companies  not  been rescued,  the
costs  of  n  piromissory  note  exchange  program,  net  of  a  partial.  recovery
from  the  liquidation  of  assets,  also  valued  at  the  time  of  the  crisis,  would
have  been  close  to  the  same amount  of  about  Baht  8  billion.  Thus  it  appears
that  the  costs  of  rehabilitating  these  institutions  are  quite  the  same as
the  costs  of closing  them  down  and  paying  off  the  depositors. Furthermore,
there  are  some  other  benefits  unique  to the  rehabilitation  option,  namely
the  continuation  of the  business  concerns  which  borrow  from these  insti*utions,
the  strength  of the  financial  system,  and the  possible  gain  from the
appreciation  of shares  held  by the  authorities.
Rehabilitation  unfortunately  has  other  costs  and  disadvantages.
The  most obvious  one  is the  cost  of using  government  facilities  and  human
resources  in the  rescue. Less  direct  but also  important  is the  fact  that,
when a rehabilitation  program  takes  place,  it is  more  difficult  to prosecute
the  former  management  than  it  would  be if  the  institution  were  closed.
Inevitably  in  many  cases,  the  authorities  were  unable  to  punish  the  guilty
parties  through  the  legal  channels,  thereby  indirectly  and  unintentionally
encouraging  unscrupulous  managers  to take  advantage  of the  lack  of market
and legal  d1iscipline.  The trade-off  between  the  objectives  of  preserving
the  financial  system's  well-h-ing  nnd  preventing  moral  hazard,  therefore,
will  probably  continue  to  pose  a difficult  issue  for  the  authorities  in
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